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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to entertain 
appeals from district courts involving domestic relations 
matters, including alimony and attorney's fees issues. Section 
78-2a-3(2)(h), Utah Code Annotated, as amended. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The first three issues all deal with alimony related 
questions. The standard of review is abuse of discretion in 
reviewing alimony questions. See for example Haslam v. Haslam, 
657 P.2d 757 (Utah 1982). 
The fourth issue addresses the propriety of an 
attorney's fee award in a petition to modify a decree of divorce. 
The standard of review is also abuse of discretion. See for 
example Munns v. Munns, 790 P.2d 116 (Utah App. 1990). 
The fifth issue asks the court to determine if a 
contract was created. That is a question of law. The standard 
of review is correction of error, no particular deference being 
given to the trial court's ruling. See for example, Herm Hughes 
& Sons, Inc. v. Quintek, Inc., 834 P.2d 582 (Utah App. 1992). 
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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUES, ORDINANCES AND RULES. 
Section 30-3-3.(1), Utah Code Annotated, as amended, 
states as follows: 
(1) In any action filed under Title 30, 
Chapter 3, 4, or 6, and in any action to 
establish an order of custody, visitation, 
child support, alimony, or division of 
property in a domestic case, the court may 
order a party to pay the costs, attorney 
fees, and witness fees, including expert 
witness fees, of the other party to enable 
the other party to prosecute or defend the 
action. The order may include provision for 
costs of the action. 
Section 30-3-5.(3), Utah Code Annotated, as amended, 
states as follows: 
(3) The court has continuing 
jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or 
new orders for the support and maintenance of 
the parties, the custody of the children and 
their support, maintenance, health, and 
dental care, or the distribution of the 
property and obligations for debts as is 
reasonable and necessary. 
Section 78-2a-3.(2)(h), Utah Code Annotated, as 
amended, states as follows: 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate 
jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(h) appeals from district court 
involving domestic relations cases, 
including, but not limited to, divorce, 
annulment, property division, child custody, 
support, visitation, adoption, and paternity; 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The parties were married on May 7, 1966. The parties 
were divorced by Judge Richard H. Moffat on December 20, 1990, 
after a trial on October 18, 1990. They had three children, two 
of which were under age 18 at the time of the divorce. The 
Plaintiff was awarded custody of the children. The Plaintiff was 
attending college at the time of the divorce. The Defendant was 
ordered to pay child support, to pay alimony, and to keep the 
Plaintiff on his health care policy while she continued her 
college education. Alimony was to continue for four years or 
while the Plaintiff continued her education. When the Plaintiff 
would be no longer enrolled full time in college, the Court 
ordered an automatic review of the alimony issue upon the request 
of the Defendant so that the Court could reduce or terminate 
alimony. The automatic alimony review provision was not 
appealed. 
On August 31, 1994, the Plaintiff graduated from the 
University of Utah with a four year degree. In October, 1994, at 
the Plaintiff's request, the Defendant agreed to forgo filing a 
request for a review of the alimony issue and to continue paying 
alimony and providing health care coverage, while the Plaintiff 
continued to seek employment. The Defendant reports that in 
return the Plaintiff agreed to seek no additional alimony or 
insurance once she found employment. 
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The Defendant did as agreed, including keeping the 
Plaintiff insured and paying alimony for October, November, 
December, January, February, March and April, 1995. The 
Plaintiff accepted and never objected to the continued health 
care coverage and alimony payments. The Plaintiff found 
employment on February 20, 1995. She then refused to honor their 
earlier bargain and insisted on the Defendant paying alimony of 
$170.00 per month for a five year period. 
The Defendant filed a Petition to Modify Decree of 
Divorce on April 24, 1995, raising the alimony and several other 
issues. The Plaintiff filed an Answer to Petition and 
Counterclaim on June 23, 1995, seeking an increase in alimony and 
raising several other issues. All issues, except alimony, were 
resolved prior to the hearing on June 12, 1996, which hearing's 
rulings are the subject of this appeal. 
Judge Sandra Peuler heard the alimony petitions of the 
parties and found that the Plaintiff's net earned income had gone 
from $110.00 per month to $1,283.00 per month, excluding alimony. 
Judge Peuler concluded that when net earned income and child 
support are added together, and before any alimony is paid, the 
Plaintiff falls approximately $250.00 short of covering her 
updated, sworn expenses. The court determined the Defendant had 
the ability to pay alimony. 
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The Court then found no substantial change in 
circumstances and refused to reduce or terminate alimony, which 
left the Plaintiff with $300.00 more in alimony than her sworn 
expenses. 
The court ignored the Plaintiff's monthly income, along 
with her $70,600.00 house equity and $9,184.00 in savings and 
ordered the Defendant to pay $1,500.00 of the Plaintiff's 
disputed attorney's fees. 
The court determined no meeting of the minds had 
occurred during the parties' discussions regarding the 
termination of alimony and health care and found no agreement. 
The Court entered the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law, and Judgment and Decree on August 5, 1996. Notice of Appeal 
was filed on August 22, 1996. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The parties' divorce trial was on October 18, 1990, 
and their divorce was final on December 21, 1990. (Transcript, 
page 10.) The decision was not appealed. 
2. The Defendant was ordered to pay alimony of $350.00 
per month for a period of time and thereafter to pay alimony of 
$550.00 per month, which was paid through April, 1995. 
(Transcript, page 11.) 
3. The Plaintiff was allowed by the original trial 
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court to spend four years completing her college education and at 
the conclusion of that period of time the Defendant could 
petition the court to reduce or to terminate alimony. 
(Transcript, page 12.) 
4. The Defendant was required to maintain health and 
accident insurance on the Plaintiff, while she was a full time 
student. (Transcript, page 13.) 
5. The Plaintiff graduated from the University of Utah 
in August, 1994, with a major in communications. (Transcript, 
page 14.) 
6. In October, 1994, the Defendant wrote "last check" 
in the lower left-hand corner of his monthly alimony check. 
(Transcript, page 14.) 
7. As a result of the Defendant's writing "last check" 
on the October alimony check, the parties discussed continuation 
of alimony and health insurance. (Transcript, pages 14, 15, 16, 
17, 18, and 19.) 
8. The Plaintiff claims that the parties agreed that 
the Plaintiff would try harder to find employment and that the 
Defendant would continue to pay alimony. (Transcript, page 17.) 
9. The Defendant claims that the parties agreed that 
the Defendant would not take the matter back to court at that 
time, that he would continue health insurance coverage, and that 
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he would continue paying alimony until the Plaintiff found a job. 
(Transcript, pages 65, 66 and 67.) 
10. In April, 1995, the Plaintiff sent a letter 
requesting that alimony be set at $170.00 per month for five 
years, which the Plaintiff claims shows the Plaintiff's state of 
mind after the Defendant demanded the agreement be honored. 
(Transcript, pages 19, 94 and 95.) 
11. In the December 20, 1990, Findings of Fact, the 
court found that the Plaintiff was earning $110.00 per month and 
the Defendant was earning $3,100.00 per month. (Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, December 20, 1990, paragraphs 8 and 9.) 
12. Judge Peular found that the Plaintiff's net full 
time employment income was $1,083.00 and her part time employment 
income was $200.00, for a total earned income of $1,283.00, and 
when child support was added in, she had income of $1,577.00 per 
month. (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, August 5, 1996, 
paragraphs 4, 5, and 6.) 
13. Judge Peular found that the Defendant's gross 
income was $3,800.00 and his net income was $2,600.00 per month. 
(Transcript, page 134.) 
14. The Plaintiff had accumulated a total of $9,184.00 
in savings at the time of the Petition hearing. (Financial 
Declaration of Arbra Johnson, paragraph 5.(d).) 
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15. The Plaintiff's house was valued by her at 
$85,000.00, less the outstanding mortgage balance of about 
$5,900.00 and another lien (to the Defendant) of $8,500.00, for a 
net equity of $70,600.00 at the time of the Petition hearing. 
(Financial Declaration of Arbra Johnson, paragraph 5.(h).) 
16. The Defendant had accumulated $425.00 in .savings 
and nothing in real property at the time of the Petition hearing. 
(Financial Declaration of Merrill Johnson, paragraph 5.(d) and 
(h) .) 
17. The Plaintiff's monthly expenses were found to be 
$1,824.00, which left the Plaintiff $250.00 per month short of 
meeting her monthly expenses. (Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law, August 5, L996, paragraph 7. See also Financial 
Declaration of Arbra Johnson, paragraph 6.) 
18. The Plaintiff's attorney charged the Plaintiff 
$80.00 per hour for his work, including 13 hours of work on a 
memorandum, the necessity of which memorandum the Defendant 
challenged. (Transcript, pages 101 and 102). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In the original Decree of Divorce the court ordered 
alimony to be reduced or terminated when the Plaintiff obtained 
her college degree. That order was not appealed. The specific 
intentions of the original court were ignored and the court 
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hearing the petition being appealed from failed to reduce or 
terminate alimony, as was intended and ordered by Judge Moffat, 
which is an abuse of discretion. 
The court hearing the petition failed to find a change 
of circumstances, even though the Plaintiff's net earned income 
increased from $110.00 per month to $1,283.00 per month,, which is 
an abuse of discretion. 
The court did not look at the Plaintiff's complete 
financial condition. The court awarded the Plaintiff $300.00 per 
month in alimony more than her sworn expenses indicated. The 
court looked only at the Plaintiff's claimed "needs". The court 
ignored the Plaintiff's overall "financial condition", including 
the almost $80,000.00 in assets of the Plaintiff. All of which 
is an abuse of discretion. 
The court ordered that the Defendant pay $1,500.00 of 
the Plaintiff's attorney's fees without considering the almost 
$80,000.00 in assets of the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff's financial 
condition is such that an award based upon need was an abuse of 
discretion. 
The court found no contract establishing an accord and 
satisfaction. The Plaintiff accepted the benefits of the 
parties' agreement and then claimed no agreement existed. The 
Plaintiff's acceptance of the benefits and actions in 
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April, 1995, establish a contract existed. The court's 
conclusion of law was incorrect and should be reversed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DID THE COURT ERR IN FAILING TO REDUCE OR TERMINATE 
ALIMONY AS ORDERED IN THE PARTIES' ORIGINAL 
DECREE OF DIVORCE? 
At the time of the parties' original divorce trial, 
October 18, 1990, the Plaintiff was attending college and the 
Defendant was working. It was anticipated that the Plaintiff 
would continue to attend college for four years, while the 
Defendant continued to work. The court did not intend alimony to 
be set at a certain level and to remain at that level longer than 
the period of the Plaintiff's college education. In paragraph 13 
of the Findings of Fact, the court stated its "intent" 
specifically as follows: 
13. ... It is the intent of the Court 
that when Plaintiff has obtained a college 
degree (other than an associate degree), that 
Defendant should have the right at that time 
to petititon the Court to review the issue of 
alimony for the purpose of determining 
whether alimony should be terminated or 
substantially reduced. To that end, alimony 
shall continue for four (4) years. At the 
end of the four-year period Defendant shall 
have the right to petition the Court for the 
purpose of determining whether alimony should 
be reduceid or terminated. If at any time 
during the four-year period, Plaintiff does 
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not maintain enrollment as a full-time 
student, Defendant shall have the right to 
petition this Court in regards to reducing or 
terminating alimony. 
The "intent" of the court was made its ruling. An 
order was issued in the accompanying Decree of Divorce, wherein 
it is stated: 
7. ... Alimony shall continue for four 
(4) years. At the end of the four-period 
Defendant shall have the right to petition 
the Court for the purpose of determining 
whether alimony should be reduced or 
terminated. If at any time during the four-
period, Plaintiff does not maintain 
enrollment as a full-time student, Defendant 
shall have the right to petition the Court in 
regards to reducing or terminating alimony. 
For four years the Plaintiff enjoyed the benefit of 
Judge Moffat's ruling and the gaining of a college degree. For 
four years the Defendant paid the alimony faithfully, expecting 
Judge Moffat's ruling to be honored when the Plaintiff graduated. 
Neither party appealed the Judge's setting of alimony for a four 
year period, with the requirement that alimony would be reduced 
or terminated when the Plaintiff graduated from college. The 
Plaintiff appears to now object to this ruling. However, she has 
waited until after the Defendant had sought to have the court 
enforce this order to reduce or terminate alimony before she 
objected to Judge Moffat's ruling. 
On April 24, 1995, the Defendant filed a Petition to 
Modify the Decree of Divorce seeking to enforce Judge Moffat's 
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Order. In response, the Plaintiff filed an Answer to Petition 
and Counterclaim, wherein she sought for an increase in alimony. 
A similar situation occurred in Campos v. Campos, 523 
P.2d 1235 (Utah 1974), wherein the court ruled at trial that the 
father should pay child support on two children of the marriage. 
No appeal was taken. Shortly thereafter, the father filed a 
petition to modify the decree and to gain custody of the children 
for himself, thus relying upon the terms of the decree. The 
court denied this petition. The father then filed a petition to 
modify the decree, wherein he claimed that one of the children 
was the son of another man and that he should not have to pay 
child support on this child that was supposedly not his. The 
court denied the petition, noting that the father did not raise 
this issue at the time of the trial or in the interim. The court 
concluded that this was merely an attempt to appeal beyond the 
time for appeal stating as follows: 
It appears to us that the defendant is 
attempting in these proceedings for a 
modification to have this court review the 
decree of divorce originally entered after 
the time for appeal from that decree has long 
since expired. 
Campos, at 1236. 
The trial court has the continuing jurisdiction to make 
subsequent changes or new orders for maintenance pursuant to 
Section 30-3-5, of the Divorce Chapter. However, the court must 
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find that the circumstances contemplated by Judge Moffat had 
changed in order to ignore the original Decree. Judge Moffat 
intended for the Plaintiff to obtain a college degree and to get 
a job. The circumstances contemplated by Judge Moffat happened. 
Judge Peular's court, in essence acting as a belated appellate 
court, failed to follow Judge Moffat's Order. 
Judge Moffat intended to allow the Plaintiff to attend 
school full time for a four year period. He could have required 
her to go to work immediately and to contribute to her support. 
He appeared to believe that a college educated person could more 
easily support herself. The Defendant was required to support 
the Plaintiff while she went to college. The Defendant did so in 
reliance upon Judge Moffat's order. 
It is patently unfair for the Plaintiff to take the 
benefit of Judge Moffat's ruling and then to ask for alimony to 
remain the same or to increase. It is also an abuse of 
discretion for Judge Peular to not enforce Judge Moffat's non-
appealed prior ruling. Alimony should be reduced or terminated 
as of the date the Petition to Modify was filed. 
POINT II 
DID THE COURT ERR IN NOT FINDING A CHANGE OF 
CIRCUMSTANCES, WHERE PLAINTIFF'S NET EARNED INCOME HAD 
INCREASED FROM $110.00 PER MONTH TO $1,283.00 PER MONTH? 
At the time of the parties' divorce, the Plaintiff was 
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found to be earning $110.00 per month. At the Petition to Modify 
hearing the Plaintiff's net take home pay from her full time 
employment was found to be $1,083.00 and from her part time 
employment was found to be $2 00.00, i.e., total income of 
$1,283.00. If child support is added in, then she was found to 
have $1,577.00 per month to spend. 
At the time of the parties' divorce, the Defendant was 
found to have gross earnings of $3,100.00 per month. At the 
Petition to Modify hearing his net income was found to be 
$2,600.00 per month. No net income was determined at the divorce 
trial for the Defendant. 
In summary, the Plaintiff's net income increased as 
follows between the divorce trial and the petition hearing: 
Date Monthly Net Earnings 
October, 1990 $110.00 
June, 1996 $1,283.00 
1,066% change (a $1,173.00 per month increase) 
In addition, the Plaintiff had accumulated a 
substantial amount of savings, i.e., $9,184.00, along with net 
equity in her house of about $70,600.00. On the other hand, the 
Defendant had accumulated no savings and had no equity in any 
real property. 
In the case of Haslam v. Haslam, 657 P.2d 757 (Utah 
1982), the Supreme Court found an abuse of discretion by a trial 
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court failing to find a substantial change in circumstances in a 
situation very much like the situation now before the court. 
In Haslamf the wife was unemployed at the time of the 
divorce. Seventeen years later, she had obtained employment and 
was earning $1,200.00 per month. She had also accumulated 
$12,000.00 in savings from which she drew interest. 
In Haslam, the husband earned between $1,000.00 and 
$1,200.00 per month at the time of the divorce. Seventeen years 
later he had retired and remarried. He received $1,250.00 per 
month from social security, a pension, and stock dividends. 
The court found as follows: 
On the instant facts it is clear that 
there has been a substantial change in 
circumstances. Since the divorce, the former 
Mrs. Haslam has obtained employment, 
experienced a substantial increase in income 
and has accumulated some savings. Mr. Haslam 
has retired and presently receives income in 
approximately the same amount as he received 
at the time of the divorce some seventeen 
years ago. 
Under the circumstances of this case, we 
think that the combination of the supporting 
spouse's retirement, together with the 
dependent spouse's employment, earning of a 
substantial income, and accumulation of 
substantial savings subsequent to the 
original divorce decree, constitutes a 
substantial change of circumstances. 
Haslam, at 758. 
The Haslam case is almost identical with the present 
case. The Plaintiff's earnings in Haslam went from zero to 
15 
$1,200.00 per month, while Ms. Johnson's earnings went from 
$110.00 to $1,283.00 per month. In Haslam the Plaintiff 
accumulated $12,000.00 in savings, while Ms. Johnson accumulated 
$9,184.0 0 in savings and $70,600.00 equity built up in her house. 
The Defendant's earnings in Haslam went from $1,000.00 
to $1,200.00 per month while Mr. Johnson's gross earnings went 
from $3,100.00 to $3,800.00 per month. Mr. Johnson's net income 
was $2,600.00 per month. In Haslam the Defendant apparently had 
accumulated some stock dividends, while Mr. Johnson has 
accumulated no assets. 
In Haslam the Supreme Court reinstated the petition and 
sent the matter back to the trial court to modify the decree as 
equity required. The Defendant seeks the same relief in this 
case. The court abused its discretion by not finding a change in 
circumstances. The Plaintiff's increase in her income doubled 
her alimony! The court should have reduced or terminated the 
Defendant's alimony payments as of the date of filing this 
action. 
POINT III 
DID THE COURT ERR BY CHOOSING TO AWARD THE PLAINTIFF 
$550.00 PER MONTH, WHICH AMOUNT EXCEEDED PLAINTIFF'S SWORN 
EXPENSES BY 5300.00 PER MONTH, AND BY NOT LOOKING AT THE 
PLAINTIFF'S COMPLETE FINANCIAL CONDITION? 
In determining a reasonable alimony award the court 
must consider three factors: 
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(1) the financial condition and needs of the receiving 
spouse; 
(2) the ability of the receiving spouse to produce a 
sufficient income for him or herself; and 
(3) the ability of the responding spouse to provide 
support. 
Munns v. Munns, 790 P.2d 116, 121 (Utah App. 1990) citations 
omitted. 
The same factors apply to petitions to modify decrees 
of divorce. Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, 767 P.2d 121 (Utah 
App. 1988). 
Judge Peular did make specific findings of fact on the 
three factors. The court concluded that when the Plaintiff's 
income of $1,577.00 is deducted from her sworn expenses of 
$1,824.00, then the Plaintiff falls about $250.00 per month short 
of meeting her expenses, which should have led the court to set 
alimony at a point no greater than $250.00 per month, instead of 
at $550.00 per month. 
As a part of the first factor, the trial court is 
obligated to consider the financial condition of the receiving 
spouse and not just that spouse's claimed needs. Munns, at 121; 
Throckmorton, at 124, along with the multitude of other cases 
cited. 
The best evidence of the Plaintiff's needs is her sworn 
Financial Declaration. It should be true. 
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At the hearing the Plaintiff claimed that the $1,824.25 
of claimed monthly expenses in the Financial Declaration, 
including the $186.00 per month she was spending for clothing and 
$150.00 per month she was spending on food were not enough. 
Either her Financial Declaration or her in court testimony was 
apparently not true. 
The financial condition of the Plaintiff was not 
considered by Judge Puelar. On her financial declaration form, 
the Plaintiff's stated value of the house was $85,000.00 less a 
mortgage of $5,923.76 and an $8,500.00 lien payable in the future 
to the Defendant. That left equity of approximately $70,600.00, 
which belonged to the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff's stated savings 
in the financial declaration form was $9,184.00. All totaled, 
the Plaintiff had a net worth of just less than $80,000.00. Her 
financial condition is not very bad. However, the court refused 
to consider her net worth. The court looked only at the 
Plaintiff's "needs'" testimony, wherein the Plaintiff claimed to 
lack money for food and clothes. 
When the court looks at all of the evidence supporting 
the court's conclusion to award $3 00.00 per month in alimony over 
and above the expenses, there is insufficient evidence to support 
the court's ruling. The court abused its discretion. It looked 
only at the Plaintiff's claimed "needs", not at her "financial 
condition". If alimony is not terminated it should at very least 
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be reduced to $250.00 per month from the date the Defendant's 
petition was filed. 
POINT IV 
DID THE FAILURE OF THE TRIAL COURT TO CONSIDER THE 
PLAINTIFF'S SUBSTANTIAL ASSETS CONSTITUTE A FAILURE TO 
FULLY CONSIDER FINANCIAL NEED FOR AN ATTORNEY'S FEE AWARD? 
By statute, Section 30-3-3, Utah Code Annotated, as 
amended, the court is authorized to award attorney's fees. It is 
well established that to recover attorney's fees the moving party 
must show evidence establishing the financial need of the 
requesting party and demonstrate the reasonableness of the amount 
of the award. Munns v. Munns, 790 P.2d 116 (Utah App. 1990), 
(Citations omitted.) 
The Plaintiff sought an award of her attorneys in this 
action. Both the financial need of the Plaintiff and the 
reasonableness of the amount of the award were challenged. The 
court found that the Plaintiff lacked the ability to pay the fees 
and that a portion of the fees were reasonable. The court then 
reduced the fee from $2,480.00 to $1,500.00 and directed the 
Defendant to pay that fee of the Plaintiff. 
On the issue of reasonableness, the Defendant claimed 
that 13 hours of the time the Plaintiff spent on a memorandum 
were unnecessary. At the Plaintiff's attorney's hourly fee of 
$80.00, that would mean $1,040.00 of the $2,480.00 fee was 
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challenged. If the $1,040.00 is deducted from the $2,480.00, a 
balance of $1,440.00 is left. Without the court specifying its 
reason for a reduction to $1,500.00, it appears that the court 
accepted the Defendant's claim that $1,040.00 of the Plaintiff's 
attorney's fees were unnecessary. Consequently, the 
reasonableness of the amount awarded is not being challenged. 
The Defendant does challenge the court's finding that 
the Plaintiff lacked the ability to pay those fees. The trial 
court failed to consider the Plaintiff's stated net worth of just 
less than $80,000.00, as was discussed above under Point III. 
The Plaintiff had $9,184.00 in savings. She had about $70,600.00 
in equity in her house. She could tap either of these assets to 
pay her attorney's fees. 
It is well established that it is an abuse of 
discretion for a court to not base an award of attorneys fee on 
need. Kerr v. Kerr. 610 P.2d 1380, 1384 (Utah 1980). The trial 
court's award of attorney's fees should be reversed and each 
party should pay their own attorney's fees. 
POINT V 
DID THE COURT ERR IN NOT FINDING AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN 
THE PARTIES TO TERMINATE ALIMONY AND HEALTH CARE WHEN THE 
DEFENDANT FULLY EXECUTED HIS PART OF THE AGREEMENT AND THE 
PLAINTIFF ACCEPTED WITHOUT OBJECTION THE BENEFITS 
TENDERED TO HER? 
Pursuant to the Decree of Divorce, the Defendant had a 
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right to seek a review of the alimony award at the end of the 
Plaintiff's full-time student enrollment (Decree, paragraph 7), 
and to discontinue health and accident insurance coverage at the 
end of the Plaintiff's full-time student enrollment (Decree, 
paragraph 17). With these two rights in mind, the parties 
discussed the issues of alimony and of continued health care 
coverage for the Plaintiff after the Defendant had written "last 
check" on his October, 1994, alimony check. 
The elements of a contract must be present in an accord 
and satisfaction, including proper subject matter, offer and 
acceptance, competent parties, and consideration. Bench v. 
Bechtel Civil & Minerals, Inc., 758 P.2d 460 (Utah App. 1988) . 
As in the Bench case, the Plaintiff does not dispute the terms of 
the agreement the Defendant detailed, i.e., he would waive his 
right for an immediate review of the alimony issue and continue 
health insurance for the Plaintiff, while she sought full-time 
employment, and in return when she obtained full time employment 
she would drop her claim for alimony. The Plaintiff merely 
claims she did not agree. The Plaintiff claims she only agreed 
to try harder to find a job. 
Likewise, as in Bench, the Plaintiff accepted, without 
objection all of the benefits of the parties' bargain. Now she 
claims there was no meeting of the minds. The court in Bench 
refused to allow the Plaintiff to accept the benefits without 
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objection and then claim no agreement existed. The court stated: 
It is well-established that "mutual assent or 
the meeting of the minds may be proved by 
words spoken as well as by acts and conduct." 
Thornton v. Pasch, 139 P.2d 1002, 1003 (Utah 
1943) . 
In addition, in Utah the doctrine of promissory 
estoppel is recognized. Suqarhouse Finance Co. v. Anderson, 
610 P.2d 1369 (Utah 1980). Promissory estoppel requires an 
individual who makes a promise, which the individual would 
reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of 
the other party, to be estopped from later denying or repudiating 
the earlier promise. Sugarhouse, at 1373. 
In this situation, the Defendant agreed to leave the 
Plaintiff covered by his health care insurance, to not seek an 
immediate review of the alimony issue, and to pay alimony until 
the Plaintiff obtained full-time employment. The Plaintiff's 
real mind set is shown by her attempt in April, 1995, to get the 
Defendant to change the deal and agree to pay her $170.00 per 
month for five years as alimony. If she truly had not agreed or 
truly needed the $550.00 per month in alimony, then why was she 
trying to negotiate a change? The answer is that she knew she 
had made a deal and now wanted out of the deal. 
The Plaintiff's actions establish her meeting of the 
mind with the Defendant. The Plaintiff's actions should now 
estop her from denying the agreement. There was an accord and 
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satisfaction and the Defendant's obligation to pay alimony should 
have terminated when the Plaintiff obtained full-time employment 
in February, 1995. 
The standard of review on the issue of whether a 
contract exists is a correction of error. No particular 
deference is given to the trial court's ruling on this question 
of law. 
An agreement was reached between the parties. They 
both behaved as if it would be honored. The Plaintiff received 
the benefits of the bargain without objection. She now claims it 
did not exist. The court should confirm the existence of the 
agreement and terminate the Defendant's alimony obligation as of 
February, 1996. 
CONCLUSION 
The court hearing the petition to modify the decree 
abused its discretion by failing to reduce or to terminate 
alimony as was originally intended. The court went further and 
failed to even find a change of circumstances when Plaintiff's 
net earned income rose from $110.00 per month to $1,283.00 per 
month. The court chose not to look at the complete financial 
condition of the Plaintiff and ignored her almost $80,000.00 in 
assets, including her $9,184.00 in savings. Consequently, the 
Plaintiff was awarded $300.00 more in alimony than her sworn 
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expenses showed and $1,500.00 in attorney's fees. This failure 
to look at the complete financial condition was an abuse of 
discretion. 
The court also found no accord and satisfaction, even 
though the Plaintiff had accepted the benefits of the parties' 
agreement. Her claim that no contract existed and the court's 
conclusion of law to that effect were not correct and should be 
reversed, terminating the Defendant's alimony obligation in 
February, 1995. 
DATED this U^ day of November, 1996 
PAUL D. LYMAN 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a full, true and correct copy of 
the above and foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT was placed in the 
United States mail at Richfield, Utah, with first-class postage 
thereon fully prepaid, on the ^ ^ day of November, 1996, 
addressed as follows: 
Gregory B. Wall 
WALL 8c WALL 
Attorney at Law 
Suite 800 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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R l » .STRICT COUIIT 
Third Judicial District 
DEC 2 0 1990 
SALT LAKH COUNTY 
Mark T. Ethington (4828) 
DAY & BARNEY 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
45 E. Vine Street 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801)262-6800 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ARBRA F. JOHNSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
MERRILL D. JOHNSON, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case no. 894904175 DA 
Judge Richard H. Moffat 
The above-entitled matter came on for trial before this Court on 
Thursday, the 18th day of October, 1990, before the Honorable Richard 
H. Moffat, District Court Judge, presiding and sitting without jury. 
The Plaintiff appeared in person and by her attorney Mark T. 
Ethington. The Defendant appeared in person and by his attorney Paul 
D. Lyman. The parties stipulated as to the majority of the issues, 
and in regards to those issues not stipulated to, the Court received 
testimony and evidence on behalf of each of the parties in support of 
their relative claims, and being fully advised in the premises now 
makes and enters its, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That Plaintiff was a bona fide and actual resident of Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah for more than three (3) months immediately 
prior to the commencement of this action. 
2. That Plaintiff and Defendant are married having been legally 
wed on the 7th day of May, 1966, in the State of Utah, City of Salt 
Lake. 
3. That the ninety day waiting period required by Section 30-3-
18, Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended), has expired. 
4. That grounds for divorce exist in that there are 
irreconcilable differences in the marriage such that the marriage can 
not continue. 
5. That the parties have two minor children born as issue of the 
marriage, namely: Brandi Johnson, born June 8, 1973; and Marilyn 
Johnson, born May 1, 1979. The parties also have a third child, 
Melanie Johnson, who has reached her majority. 
6. That the parties stipulated in open court that the Plaintiff 
is a fit a proper person to have the sole care, custody, and control 
of the parties' minor children following the entry of a final Decree 
of Divorce in this matter. 
7. That it was further stipulated by the parties in open court 
that the Defendant should be awarded reasonable rights of visitation 
at such times and places as agreed upon by the parties. 
8. That, for purposes of determining child support and alimony, 
the Defendant's average monthly income will be $3,100.00. This 
figure was derived after the Court received testimony by an employee 
of Defendant's employer that Defendant's average monthly income would 
be $3,423.00, and testimony from Defendant that he spent 
approximately $347.60 per month in auto expenses for his employment 
for which he was not reimbursed. Consequently, the Court gave a 
credit for the monthly auto expense leaving an approximate monthly 
income of $3,100.00. 
9. That, for purposes of determining child support and alimony/ 
the Plaintiff's average monthly income is $110.00. 
10. That the minor children of the parties are in need of 
support, and, pursuant to the child support worksheet attached 
hereto, the total amount of child support to be paid by Defendant 
should be $588.79 per month. 
11. That the parties stipulated in open court that the child 
support would be paid on the first of each month, and that the child 
support would be paid through the clerks office at the Third District 
Court. 
12. That if the Defendant becomes delinquent in his child support 
obligation for the minor children of the parties' in an amount at 
least equal to child support payable for one month, then the 
Plaintiff shall be entitled to mandatory income withholding relief 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 78-45d-l, et seq. (1953 as 
amended). This income withholding procedure shall apply to existing 
and future payors. All withheld income shall be submitted to the 
Office of Recovery Services, P.O. Box 15450, Salt lake City, Utah 
84115-0400, until such time as the Defendant no longer owes child 
support for the remaining minor child of the parties. 
13. That Plaintiff is in need of support in the form of alimony, 
and based upon the monthly expenses of Plaintiff, and based upon the 
Defendant's ability to pay, the amount of alimony should be $3 50.00 
per month, and when Brandi turns 18 on June 8, 1991, th'e amount of 
alimony should increase to $550.00 per month. Alimony is to be paid 
the first of each month through the clerks office at the Third 
District Court. It is the intent of the Court that when Plaintiff 
has obtained a college degree (other than an associate degree), that 
Defendant should have the right at that time to petition the Court to 
review the issue of alimony for the purpose of determining whether 
alimony should be terminated or substantially reduced. To that end, 
alimony shall continue for four (4) years. At the end of the four-
year period Defendant shall have the right to petition the Court for 
the purpose of determining whether alimony should be reduced or 
terminated. If at any time during the four-year period, Plaintiff 
does not maintain enrollment as a full-time student, Defendant shall 
have the right to petition this Court in regards to reducing or 
terminating alimony. 
14. That the parties should, by April 30th of each year 
hereafter, exchange W-2 forms and tax returns. This should be done 
to facilitate any adjustments in child support and alimony. 
15. That it was stipulated in open court by the parties that the 
minor children are in need of health insurance, and that the 
Defendant should continue to maintain the minor children on the 
health insurance policy maintained through his employment. That the 
parties should equally share in the payment of deductible and 
uncovered medical and dental expenses, except that major medical and 
dental expenses, such as braces for Marilyn, should be paid by the 
parties according to the same ratio that each party pays for child 
support as indicated by the child support worksheet attached hereto. 
That the parties should consult with one another, in non-emergency 
situations, regarding whether to incur major medical and dental 
expenses. The Defendant's consent to non-emergency, major uncovered 
medical and dental services should not be unreasonably withheld. 
16. That the Defendant should maintain a life insurance policy on 
himself with the minor children as beneficiaries with each child to 
be listed as a 50% beneficiary so long as each child is a minor. 
17. That it was stipulated in open court that the parties 
maintained a marital residence at 3442 W. Brett Ave. in Salt Lake 
County, and that the stipulated value of the residence is $52,000.00, 
and that the Plaintiff should be awarded the house subject to an 
equitable lien in favor of the Defendant in the amount of $8,500.00. 
18. That the parties stipulated in open court that, assuming the 
second mortgage is completely paid by the Defendant, there is 
approximately $42,000.00 in equity in the home, and that the 
Defendant currently has two IRA's through his employment worth 
approximately $25,000.00, and that the Defendant should keep the 
IRA's free and clear of any interest of Plaintiff's, and that 
Plaintiff should be given a $12,500.00 credit against Defendant's 
interest (which is $21,000.00), in the equity in the home, leaving 
the Defendant an $8,500.00 equitable interest in the home. 
19. That in order to perfect the Defendant's interest in the 
home, the Defendant should convey by Quit-Claim deed his interest in 
the home to the Plaintiff, and in return, the Plaintiff .should 
execute in favor of the Defendant a Trust Deed and Note against the 
home in the amount of $8,500.00. 
20. That the parties stipulated in open court that Plaintiff 
should pay the $8,500.00 to the Defendant when the Plaintiff sells 
the home, or when the Plaintiff remarries, or when the youngest child 
of the parties, Marilyn, reaches age 18, whichever occurs first. 
21. That it was stipulated in open court that the Defendant 
should continue to pay those debts of the parties that he has 
heretofore paid since the separation of the parties, and in 
particular, that the Defendant should continue to pay and be 
responsible for the second mortgage on the home. That it was further 
stipulated that each party would be responsible for the individual 
debts they have incurred since the parties separated. 
22. That it was stipulated in open court that the Defendant would 
be awarded the boat, the camper, and the 4X4 truck, and that the 
Defendant would sell these items and use the proceeds to pay off the 
second mortgage. 
23. That it was stipulated in open court that the Defendant 
should be awarded those items of personal property in the garage as 
agreed upon by the parties. 
24. That it was stipulated in open court that as long as both 
parties remain unmarried, and as long as the Plaintiff remains a 
full-time student, the Defendant should be required to maintain the 
Plaintiff on the health and accident insurance policy offered through 
his employment. 
25. That it was stipulated in open court that the Plaintiff 
should be awarded the Oldsmobile, and Defendant should be awarded the 
Monte Carlo, each free and clear of any interest of the other. 
26. That the Defendant should be allowed to claim the two minor 
children as exemptions for income tax purposes. 
27. That based upon representations of counsel for Plaintiff as 
to the time he has spent on this case and the amount of fees he has 
charged, the Plaintiff should be awarded attorneys fees in the 
amount of $1,500.00. The attorneys fees may be paid in monthly 
installments as agreed upon by Defendant and counsel for Plaintiff. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and 
enters its, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Plaintiff is entitled to a Decree of Divorce dissolving 
the bonds of matrimony in this marriage upon the grounds set forth in 
the Findings of Fact. The Decree shall become final upon its entry. 
2. The specific Findings above are to be enforceable as an order 
of this Court, and are set forth in the Decree entered in this 
I certify that I am employed by the office of Day & Barney, and 
that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law, postage pre-paid, to: 
Paul D. Lyman, Esq. 
Attorney for Defendant 
250 N. Main 
Richfield, Utah 84701 
on this day of December, 1990. 
Mark T. Ethington (4828) 
DAY & BARNEY 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
45 E. Vine Street 
Murray, Utah 84 107 
Telephone: (801)262-6800 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ARBRA F. JOHNSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MERRILL D. JOHNSON, 
Defendant. 
The above-entitled matter came on for trail before this Court on 
Thursday, the 18th day of October, 1990, before the Honorable Richard 
H. Moffat, District Court Judge, presiding and sitting without jury. 
The Plaintiff appeaired in person and by her attorney Mark T. 
Ethington. The Defendant appeared in person and by his attorney Paul 
D. Lyman. The parties stipulated as to the majority of the issues, 
and in regards to those issues not stipulated to, the Court received 
testimony and evidence on behalf of each of the parties in support of 
their relative claims. The Court, after being fully advised and 
having rendered its decision herein by way of written Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law, and it appearing that judgment should be 
entered in accordance therewith, it is hereby, 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
FiiEeSJSTBlCTGOUP.I 
Third Judicial District 
DEC 2 0 1990 
SALT \Ml4S£i 
u .^ 
?:06 a/on-
Case No. 894904175 DA 
Judge Richard H. Moffat 
1. The Plaintiff is awarded a Decree of Divorce dissolving the 
bonds of matrimony between Plaintiff and Defendant. The Decree 
shall become final upon entry and is awarded by reason of grounds 
found by the Court in accordance with Utah Code Ann., Section 30-3-1 
(1953 as amended), to wit: There are irreconcilable differences in 
the marriage such that the marriage cannot continue. 
2. The parties have two minor children born as issue of the 
marriage, namely: Brandi Johnson, born June 8, 1973; and Marilyn 
Johnson, born May 1, 1979. The parties also have a third child, 
Melanie Johnson, who has reached her majority. 
3. The Plaintiff is awarded the care, custody and control of the 
parties7 minor children, with the Defendant to have reasonable rights 
of visitation as agreed upon by the parties. 
4. The Defendant shall pay child support in the total amount of 
$588.79 per month. The amount of child support is calculated 
pursuant to the child support worksheet attached hereto and by this 
reference made a part hereof. 
5. The child support shall be paid by the first of each month, 
and shall be paid through the clerks office at the Third District 
Court. 
6. If the Defendant becomes delinquent in his child support 
obligation in an amount at least equal to child support payable for 
one month, then the Plaintiff shall be entitled to mandatory income 
withholding relief pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 78-45d-l, et 
seq. (1953 as amended). This income withholding procedure shall 
apply to existing and future payors. All withheld income shall be 
submitted to the Office of Recovery Services, P.O. Box 15450, Salt 
lake City, Utah 34 115-0400, until such time as the Defendant no 
longer owes child support for the remaining minor child of the 
parties. 
7. The Defendant shall pay alimony to the Plaintiff in the 
amount of $350.00 per month, and when Brandi turns 18 on June 8, 
1991, the amount of alimony shall increase to $550.00 per month. 
Alimony is to be paid by the first of each month, and is to be paid 
through the clerks office at the Third District Court. Alimony shall 
continue for four (4) years. At the end of the four-period Defendant 
shall have the right to petition the Court for the purpose of 
determining whether alimony should be reduced or terminated. If at 
any time during the four-period, Plaintiff does not maintain 
enrollment as a full-time student, Defendant shall have the right to 
petition the Court in regards to reducing or terminating alimony. 
8. The parties shall, by April 30th of each year hereafter, 
exchange W-2 forms and tax returns and paycheck stubs in order to 
facilitate any adjustments in child support and alimony. 
9. The Defendant shall continue to maintain the minor children 
on the health and accident insurance policy maintained through his 
employment. The parties shall equally share in the payment of 
deductible and uncovered medical and dental expenses, except that 
major medical and dental expenses, such as braces for Marilyn, shall 
be paid by the parties according to the same ratio that each party 
is responsible for child support as indicated by the child support 
worksheet attached hereto and by this reference made a part hereof. 
The parties shall consul t witheac w. -; ergency 
situations, regarding whether to incur major icovered medical or 
dental expenses. The Defendant's consent to non-emergenc.. major, 
uncovered med Ica] and den 1:a 1 servIces sha 1 ] i Iot be i inreat> i;.olv 
withheld. 
10. The Defendant shall maintain a life insurance policy on 
himself with I:he rntI noi: chi 1 dren as the beneficiaries with each chi 1 d 
to be listed as a 50% beneficiary so long as each child is a minor. 
il. The Plaintiff shall be awarded the marital residence of the 
parties located a !:  3442 W Brett Ave., in Salt Lake County, subject 
to an equitable lien in favor of the Defendant in the amount of 
$-8#5oo.OO, Which shall be due and payable when the PI ai nt :i ff sells 
the house, remarries, or when the youngest child, Marilyn, reaches 
the age whichever occurs first Defendant shall give to 
P ;ir^ - * ^ . t CI c-* j - " • . home to 
Plaintiff, and Plaintiff shall ,j. , -. L^ ~ Defendant i :>, *st Deed 
and Note for the amount . f the equitable nterest. 
12. The Def endai • . : ^ _<.. • •*. i .. 
through his employment free and clear of any Interest of the 
Plaintiff. 
11 The Defendant shii 1 1 o»nt lime lu 11 IL "| im! be responsible for 
those debts of the parties that he has heretofore paid since the 
separation of the parties. In particular, the Defendant shall pay 
and be responsible for the second mortgage on the marital residence. 
14. The parties shall be responsible for the individual debts 
they have incurred since the separation of the parties. 
15. The Defendant shall be awarded the boat, the 4X4 truck, and 
the camper, and the Defendant shall sell these items and use the 
proceeds thereof to pay off the second mortgage. 
16. The Defendant shall be awarded those items of personal 
property in the garage as agreed upon by the parties. 
17. As long as both parties remain unmarried, and as long as 
Plaintiff remains a full-time student, Plaintiff shall remain on the 
Defendant's health and accident insurance policy offered through his 
employment. 
18. The Plaintiff shall be awarded the Oldsmobile and the 
Defendant shall be awarded the Monte- Carlo, both free and clear of 
any interest of the other party. 
19. The Defendant shall be allowed to claim the minor children as 
exemptions for income tax purposes. 
20. The Plaintiff is awarded $1,500.00 in attorneys fees. This 
amount shall be paid to Plaintiff's attorney. The attorneys fees may 
be paid in monthly installments as agreed upon by Defendant and 
counsel for Plaintiff. 
Dated this <=rC day of December, 1990. 
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DEPUTY 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that 1 am employed by the office of Day & Barney, and 
that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Decree of 
Divorce, postage pre-paid, to: 
Paul D. Lyman, Esq. 
Attorney for Defendant 
250 N. Main 
Richfield, Utah 8 1/01 
on thxs day of December, 1990. 
GREGORY B. WALL (3365) 
WALL & WALL 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Suite 800 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
521-8220 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
) 
ARBRA F. JOHNSON, : 
) FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
Plaintiff : CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
V. : 
MERRILL D. JOHNSON, : Civil No. 894904175 DA 
Defendant : Judge Sandra Peuler 
) 
On the 12th day of June, 1996, the defendant's petition to 
modify the Decree of Divorce by eliminating the alimony requirement 
entirely, together with the plaintiff's counter petition to modify 
the Decree to increase the alimony award to her, came on for 
hearing before the court sitting without a jury, the honorable 
Sandra Peuler presiding. The plaintiff was present and represented 
by her attorney, Gregory B. Wall. The defendant was present and 
represented by his attorney, Paul D. Lyman. Both parties were 
sworn and testified concerning the issues presented here. Various 
exhibits were introduced and received by the court. Based upon the 
testimony and evidence, and the court being fully advised in the 
premises and the law, does herewith make and enter the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. At the time of the Decree the child support paid to 
plaintiff was $58 1 ner month, alimony of $350.00 per month, 
income from her shop of $110.00 per month, for a monthly income of 
$1,048.00. 
2. At the time of the entry of the Decree her expenses were 
$1,250.00. 
3. At the time of the entry of the Decree her income did not 
meet her expenses, let alone the standard of living she had enjoyed 
during the course of her marriage of 24 years to the defendant. 
4. Since t:l le date of the Decree the plaintiff has completed 
her education at the University o^ T ir* has become employed 
full time, with 1 monthly gross income of $1,573.00, and a net take 
home pay of 83.82. This figure was arrived at b> adding back 
a couple of small voluntary contributions deducted from her pay, 
and multiplying a pay period, found to be 80 hours, times 2.15. 
5. The court finds that her ciii:reiit shop income is $200.00 per 
month, and that her child support is $294.00 per month. 
6 If the plaintiff receives no alimony her monthly income is 
$1,577.00. 
7. Since the date of the Decree her expenses have also 
increased and the court finds that her monthly expenses are 
$1,824.00 per month, which leaves her approximately $250.00 per 
month short of her expense needs. 
8. The plaintiff has testified and the court finds that her 
income does not meet her needs. 
9. The plaintiff is unable to purchase sufficient clothing and 
food for herse] f a rid the :il :ti ] d 
10 Based upon the testimony the plaintiff's expenses 
substantially exceed her monthly income and her income falls 
substantially short of meeting her needs. 
11. Since the date of the Decree the defendant's income has 
also increased. At the time of the Decree his income was found to 
be $3,100.00 per month. His income for 1994 was $3,800.00 per 
month, and he testified that it remained about the same for 1995 as 
it was for 1994. 
12. The defendant's income after taxes is $2,60.0.00 per month, 
and his expenses, including his child support obligation, total 
$2,083.00 per month. 
13. The court finds that the defendant has a continuing 
ability to pay alimony in the amount originally ordered by the 
court. 
14. Alimony has been in place five years, but the plaintiff is 
has still not reached a level to support her needs, let alone her 
prior standard of living, without alimony from the defendant. 
15. The purpose of alimony to provide a standard of living for 
the divorced spouse commensurate with her standard of living during 
the marriage has not been met, yet the defendant has continued to 
enjoy the same standard of living that he had during the marriage. 
16. The defendant has urged the court to find that the 
plaintiff could obtain financial relief by refinancing the home, 
but there has been no evidence presented that she could qualify, 
what the payments might be, or what relief might be provided. 
Defendant has asked the court to speculate as to the effects of 
refinancing the home and other avenues of relief through obtaining 
loans by plaintiff, but no evidence has been presented to support 
any finding in defendant's favor, n that such avenues would 
provide any relief to the plaintiff. 
17. The defendant has alleged in his petition to modify that 
an agreement was entered into by the parties to terminate the 
alimony in the fall of 1994, or spring of 1995. 
18. There is evidence that the parties discussed alimony 
termination, but there is no evidence that there was ever a meeting 
Q£ ^Yie minds on any terms of an agreement to terminate. Although 
offers and counteroffers were made over a period of time there was 
never an agreement reached nor any offer accepted by either party. 
19. While the defendant's petition is based solely upon the 
agreement, the parties have mutually agreed that the court could 
consider the issue of a substantial change in circumstances. 
20. The plaintiff's counter petition Li increase the alimony 
is likewise not supported by a substantial change in circumstances 
of the parties. 
21. The plai nl i I I ha,; im ut n il i linney's fees, but she lacks 
the ability to pay those fees. At the same time the defendant has 
the ability to assist the plaintiff in the payment of her 
attorney's fees, plus the court I indi» IhiL I he pLamtiff has 
substantially prevailed in these proceedings. Evidence has been 
received as to the fees incurred and the reasonableness of the 
fees. Ihe euuit finds the fees to be reasonable and necessary I i u 
the purpose of representing the plaintiff, and accordingly a fair 
amount of tees to be paid by defendant to the plaintiff is 
$1,500 00. 
22. The defendant unilaterally ceased paying alimony to the 
plaintiff in April, 1995, his last payment being for that month, 
but no payments have been since. The plaintiff should be granted 
a judgment for the arrearage, which totals $7,150.00 through and 
including June, 1996. 
FROM THE FOREGOING the court now makes and enters the 
following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. There has been no substantial change in circumstances 
warranting modifying the Decree of Divorce to either decrease, 
eliminate altogether, or increase the alimony paid to the plaintiff 
by defendant, and therefore the monthly amount of $550.00 shall 
continue. Accordingly, the petitions of both parties should be 
denied. 
2. There was no agreement reached by the parties to either 
decrease or eliminate the alimony requirement. 
3. The plaintiff is entitled to back alimony not paid to her 
by the defendant, commencing with payment due for May, 1995, and 
which amount totals $7,150.00 through June, 1996, and a judgment 
for said amount shall be entered against the defendant and in favor 
of plaintiff, plus interest thereon at the rate of 7.35% per annum. 
He shall be given the right to make reasonable monthly payments to 
pay said indebtedness. 
4. A judgment against defendant and in favor of plaintiff 
shall be entered in the amount of $1,500.00 for attorney's fees 
incurred by plaintiff, plus interest thereon at the rate of 12% per 
annum. The defendant shall be given the opportunity to make 
reasonable monthly payments thereon. 
5. As long as reasonable and regular monthly payments are made 
on the above judgments the plaintiff may not execute on said 
judgments. 
6. Defendant shall pay his own costs and attorney's fees 
incurred in these proceedings. 
DATED this day of , 1996. 
BY THE COURT: 
SANDRA PEULER 
District Judge 
Approved as to form: 
Stux 
PAUL D. LYMAN 
Attorney for Defendant 
GREGORY B. WALL (33 65) 
WALL & WALL 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Suite 800 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
521-8220 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
) 
ARBRA F. JOHNSON, : 
) JUDGMENT AND DECREE 
Plaintiff : 
V. : 
) Civil No. 894904175 DA 
MERRILL D. JOHNSON, 
) Judge Sandra Peuler 
Defendant : 
) 
On the L2th day of June, 1996, the petition of the defendant 
to terminate alimony to the plaintiff and the petition of the 
plaintiff to increase the amount of alimony both came on for 
hearing before the court, the honorable Sandra Peuler presiding. 
The plaintiff was present and represented by her attorney, Gregory 
B. Wall. The defendant was likewise present and represented by his 
attorney, Paul D. Lyman. 
Both parties were sworn and testified, evidence was offered 
and received by the court, and the court being fully advised in the 
law and the premises, and the court having heretofore made and 
entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, does herewith 
ADJUDGE AND DECREE AS FOLLOWS: 
1. Neither party has shown a substantial change in 
circumstances warranting a modification of the Decree as to 
alimony, and accordingly the alimony payment to be paid to 
plaintiff by defendant in the amount of $550.00 per month shall 
continue without change. 
2. The defendant is ordered to pay the plaintiff the arrearage 
in alimony that have accrued, which total $7,150.00 through June, 
1996. A judgment against defendant and in favor of plaintiff for 
said amount is granted with interest thereon at the rate of 7.35% 
per annum The defendant is ordered to make reasonable monthly 
payments on this amount to the plaintiff and plaintiff is 
restrained from executing upon the judgment provided the defendant 
makes regular monthly payments in reasonable amounts. 
defendant is ordered to pay to plaintiff the sum of 
$1,500.00 for her attorney's fees incurred in these proceedings, 
with interest thereon at the rate of 7.35% per annum. The 
defendant is ordered to make regular monthly payments on this 
amount and the plaintiff is restrained from executing on said 
judgment provided the defendant makes regular, reasonable monthly 
payments. 
4, 1To agreement was made between the parties to modify or 
eliminate the alimony and the petition of defendant to modify the 
decree on the basis of an agreement between the parties is denied. 
5. Defendant is directed to pay his own costs and attorney's 
fees incurred in this action. 
DATED this day of , 1996. 
BY THE COURT: 
SANDRA PEULER 
District Court Judge 
The foregoing Decree approved as to form: 
PAUL D. LYMAN 
Attorney for Defendant 
WAIL & WALL (A.PC) 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
"' WTE 800 BOSTON BU'LDING 
SALT LAKE CITY UTAH 84111 
STEVEN B. WALL, NO. 3679 
WALL & WALL, a.p.c. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Suite 800 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-8220 
IN THh THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRH I COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ARBRA JOHNSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MERRILL I). JOHNSON, 
Defendant. 
NOTICE OF ENTRY OF JUDGMENT 
AND DECREE 
( iv i I Mo II 149 04 I /S 1)/, 
Judge Peuler 
TO THE DEFENDANT ABOVE-NAMED AND HIS ATTORNEY OF RECORD: 
You are hereby not itiod t hat the Judgment md Decree filed in 
the above-entitled matter was entered by the Court on the 5th day 
of August, 109G. 
DATED this day A lit J It 
GREGORY B / WALL, 
Attorney «aor Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Notice of Entry of Judgment and Decree was mailed, 
postage prepaid to on this Q day of August, 1996 to the 
following: 
Paul Lyman, Esq. 
835 East 300 North, #100 
Richfield, Utah 84701 
retary "to Gregory^B. Wall 
In the Third lidiciul District Court of Salt Lake County 
STATE OF UTAH 
vs. 
Husband: 
Address: _ 
Soc. Sec. No.:. 
Occupation: 
Employer: 
Birthdate: 
Plaintiff 
Defendant 
Case No. 
Jhiii;i 111 nil 1 h/chriif iofi 
Dated: 
Wife: ALhr^_J.ohns.ojTL 
Address: 3442 B r e t t Avenue 
West V a l l e y C i t y . UT 84119 
Soc. Sec. No.: 5 2 8 - 6 8 - 6 5 4 6 
Occupation: A d m i n i s t r a t i v e A s s i s t a n t 
Employer: Corp . of t h e P r e s i d e n t - L . D . S . Church 
Birthdate: 4 / 2 4 / 4 6 
NOTE: THIS DECLARATION MUST BE FILED WITH THE DOMESTIC CALENDAR CLERK 5 DAYS 
PRIOR TO THE PRE-TRIAL HEARING. 
FAILURE BY EITHER PARTY TO COMPLETE, PRESENT, AND FILE THIS FORM AS REQUIRED WILL 
AUTHORIZE THE COURT TO ACCEPT THE STATEMENT OF THE OTHER PARTY AS THE BASIS FOR 
ITS DECISION. 
ANY FALSE STA I EMENT MADE HEREON SHALL SUBJECT YOU TO THE PENALTY FOR 
PERJURY AND MAY BE CONSIDERED A FRAUD UPON THE COURT. 
STATEMENT OF INCOME, EXPENSES, ASSETS AND LIABILITIES 
(NOTE: To arrive at monthly figures when income is received and 
deductions are made weekly, multiply by 4.3; if figures are on a bi-weekly 
basis, multiply by 2.167) 
1. Gross monlhly income from: 
Snlnry nrul wages, including commissions, bonuses, 
allowances and overtime, payable (pay 
period) e v e r y 2 w e e k s 
Pensions and retirement 
Social security 
Disability and unemployment insurance 
Public assistance (welfare, AFDC payment, etc.). 
Child support from nny prior mnrringc 
Dividends and interest 
Rents _ _ 
All other sources: (Specify) H ^ i r H a v p n . S h y l i n g .9^ 1 r>n 
TOTAL MONTHLY INCOMF 
Itemize monthly deductions from gross income: 
State and federal income taxes 
Number of exemptions taken ... 
Social security 
Medical or other insurance (describe fully) 
24 h r . A c c i d e n t a l D e a t h & Dismemberment 
Union or other dues 
Retirement or pension fund 
Savings plan 
Credit union . 
| HUSBAND 
$ 
r 
$ 
| WIFE 
$ 
i,ao0.oo 
2 9 4 . 0 0 
2 0 7 . 0 0 
$ 
* 1 , T*01. 00 
2 5 9 . 0 2 
0 
1 2 2 . 5 5 
5 9 . 3 6 
1 .84 
2 5 . 8 4 — 
Other: (specify) U T A B U S P A S S 
O f f i c e Fund 
TOTAL MONTHLY DEDUCTIONS 
Net monthly income • take home pay 
$ 
$ 
7 . 6 0 
2 . 0 0 
$ 4 8 8 . 2 1 
$ 
Debts and obligations: 
Creditor's Name For 
First Instate Bank Aut.omobiJLe 
Bank One Mortgage Corp. Home 
Dale Payable 
...1.0 th..... 
1st 
Perkins/NDSL 
Balance 
Loan 1 s t 
E^Jierj$^JTe.c_^ In.c_,_ l o a n 1.0 t h 
N a H n n a l R e a n t y S e r v i c e Shop lOtJh 
Shop Tj_r_ensing F e e s d i t y , c o u n t y , s t a t e y e a r l y 
$9AJL5^AA 
5 9 2 3 . 7 8 
_lS_Q4_^&d 
jza&o^ad 
Monthly Payment 
2 4 2 . 9 6 
2 2 4 . 0 0 
4 0 . 0 0 
.&S_09-
7 . 5 5 
1 0 . 0 0 
TOTAL $
 7511Pi . f id l$ RRQf iO 
(If insufficient space, insert total and attach schedule) 
5. AH property of the parties known to mc owned individually or jointly (indicate who holds or how title held: (H) Husband, (W) Wife, (J) Jointly). 
WHERE SPACE IS INSUFFICIENT FOR COMPLETE INFORMATION OR LISTING PLEASE ATTACH SEPARATE SCHEDULE. 
Value Owed Thereon 
(a) Household furnishings, furniture, 
appliances and equipment 
(b) Automobile (Year-Make) 1 9 9 5 S a t u r n S L 2 
F i r s t I n t e r s t a t e Bank (W) 
$ 
1 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 
J L 4 U 5 2 J L ^ & Q _ 
$ 
0 
Q r 4 7 S . 4 4 
(c) Securities - stocks, bonds 
(d) Cash and Deposit Accounts (banks, savings & loans, 
credit unions - savings and checking) 
West One Bank 
G r a n i t e C r e d i t Union 
OppenheimerFunds 
1J85Q..J.2_ 
2 5 7 . 1 5 
7 , 0 7 7 . 0 6 
(e) Life Insurance: Cash value, accumulated 
Name o' Ccr~p:iny Policy No. Face Ar:ount dividend, or loan amount 
Farmpr'.q Mew World T.i f P 001 ^ 07645 $ S,Q??.7fi$ mortgage Ins. 
D e s e r e t H e a l t h c a r e L i f e AQ^OSUDJO _ r e d u c i n g t o $ 1 0 , 0 0 0 
(0 Profit sharing or Retirement Accounls 
Name P i n n p p r TT (IRA 
Name 
Value of interest and amount presently vested 
__$.50o...o.a 
(g) Other Personal Property and Assets (specify) 
(h) Real Estate (Where more than one parcel of real estate owned, attach slice! with identical information for all additional property) 
Address__3-442-Brett A v e n u e (Jl) 
flp.Qh V a l l e y C i t y , UT 8 4 1 1 9 
Original CostS . . J L 6 L , _ 2 0 . . 0 - - 0 0 ___ 
Cost of Additions % _ 1 . 0 L L J 0 O . O _ . J O O 
Total Cost $ J2.6^-O.Q_^OQ 
Mtg. Balance $ 5 _ , 9 2 3 , 7 6 -
Other Liens $ _ 8 ^ _ 5 0 J 0 _ - _ O 0 
Equity $ _ 2 0 , 5 7 . f i . J M L _ 
Monthly Amortization Z.Z.H . 00 
Taxes $ 6 1 5 . 8_3_ 
Individual contributions » ^ T ~ ~ 
Type of Property R e s L d e n . t J L a J L 
Date of Acquisition 7 / 3 / 7 0 
Total Present Value $ . . 8 5 / J3Q.Q_._0_0 
Basis of Valuation homes s o l d i n t h e a r e a 
And to whom Bank One M o r t g a g e Corp 
(i) Business Interest (indicate name, share, type of business value less indebtedness) 
Hair Haven Styling Salon/ Owner/operator, None 
(j) Other assets (Specify) 
Total monthly expenses: *(Specify which party is the custodial parent and list name and rclalionship of all members of the household whose 
expenses arc included.) 
• W = C u s t o d i a l P a r e n t 
M a r i l y n - D a u g h t e r 
Rent or mortgage payments (residence) 
Real property taxes (residence) 
Real property insurance (residence) 
Maintenance (residence) 
Food and household supplies 
Utilities including water, electricity, gas and heat 
Telephone 
Laundry and cleaning 
Clothing 
Medical P r e s c r i p t i o n s 
Dental 
Insurance (life, accident, comprehensive liability, disability) Exclude Payroll Deducted 
Child Care 
Payment of child spousal support re: prior marriage 
School 
Entertainment (includes clubs, social obligations, travel recreation) 
Incidentals (grooming, tobacco, alcohol, gifts, and donations) 
Transportation (other than automobile) 
Auto expense (gas. oil. repair, insurance) 
Auto payments 1 
Installment paymcnt(s). (Insert total and attach itemized schedule 
if not fully set forth in (d) on the first page hereof) 
Other expenses (Insert total and specify on attached schedule) 
TOTAL EXPENSES 1 
HUSBAND 
$ 
$ 
WIFE 
$ 
2 2 4 . 0 0 
I n c l u d e d ! 
I n c l i i d e d j 
2 0 7 . 1 " -
1 5 0 . 0 0 1 
| 1 8 1 . 3 4 
3 2 . 0 8 
2 0 . 0 0 
| 1R6 .00 
\ 2 3 . 0 0 
0 
6 . 3 4 
N/A 
N/A 
8 . 3 3 
1 0 . 0 0 
1 7 0 . 6 6 
N/A 
1 6 7 . 7 1 
2 4 2 , 9 6 
1 0 5 . 0 6 
8 9 . 6 4 $ [ 
LVZ4.25 1 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
ss. 
I swear that the matters stated herein are true and correct. 
Subscribed and sworn lo before nuc this day «>l 
. W. 
Notary Public residing in Salt Lake County, Utah 
My Commission Expires:. 
BRING TO THE PRE-TRIAL HEARING ALL DOCUMENTS AND OTHER SUPPORTING INFORMATION 
NECESSARY TO VERIFY OR EXPLAIN THE STATEMENTS MADE IN THIS DECLARATION, INCLUDING 
BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PAYROLL STUBS FOR THE MOST RECENT 90 DAYS, 3 MOST RECENT TAX 
RETURNS, CREDIT UNION SHARE STATEMENTS, PASSBOOKS, CHECKBOOKS, CANCELLED CHECKS, 
CERTIFICATES, POLICIES AND OTHER RELEVANT AND MATERIAL DOCUMENTATION. 
